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Abstract 
Subtest-level interpretation of intelligence tests is necessary for understanding the 
relationship between cognitive deficiencies and academic problems and for designing 
interventions based on assessment results.  However, the practice of subtest interpretation 
continues to be discouraged by those who claim that subtests have poor reliability and 
thus minimal interpretative power.  This perception of subtest instability may be the 
result of misguided conceptions of reliability and not actual properties of subtests. With 
this in mind, the present study sought to determine the extent to which a 
neuropsychologically based performance model fit WISC-IV subtest test-retest data and 
offered an alternate means of understanding and interpreting the concept of subtest 
reliability.  Higher rates of score progression versus regression were demonstrated for all 
subtests regardless of whether or not time 1 scores were above or below the mean.  Rates 
of score increases from time 1 to time 2 varied based on the neuropsychological basis of 
the task being assessed.   Results suggest that a neuropsychologically based performance 
model is superior to a traditional psychometric model for representing WISC-IV subtest 
reliability and the manner in which individuals use their brains when they engage tasks. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The history of Wechsler Scales interpretation has been marked by ongoing debate 
between Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) advocates and those who favor analysis of individual 
strengths and weaknesses at the index, subtest, and item levels. Recognizing the tendency 
of global (FSIQ) and index scores to obscure clinically relevant information, advocates of 
subtest-level interpretation argue that this approach is necessary for understanding 
children’s cognitive deficits and providing interventions.  However, subtest-level 
interpretation continues to be criticized on the basis that subtests have poor reliability and 
limited interpretative power.  These criticisms may be the result of misguided 
conceptions of reliability that fail to consider the manner in which individuals use their 
brains when they engage tasks.  With this in mind, the present study was designed to 
accomplish two goals. The first was to determine the extent to which a 
neuropsychologically based performance model could account for actual subtest test-
retest findings for one of the Wechsler Scales, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children-Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003).  The second was to determine the 
effectiveness of a neuropsychologically based performance model compared to 
traditional psychometric procedures in terms of the type of information it provides test 
consumers regarding WISC-IV subtest reliability. 
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Literature Review 
Review of the History and Methods of Wechsler Scales Interpretation 
Global composite intelligence test score interpretation, referred to in this study as 
FSIQ, has its roots in Spearman’s (1904) factor analytic studies that suggested a single 
factor common to all the cognitive tasks he studied.  Spearman labeled this underlying 
factor as g.  Over time, g has come to be viewed as the quintessential measure of overall 
intellectual ability. Currently, g is thought to be represented and quantified via the FSIQ 
in tests such as the WISC-IV, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition 
(WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2008), and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence-Third Edition (WPPSI; Wechsler, 2002).  G is conceptualized as a trait that 
is stable over time and not easily modified by educational or environmental interventions 
(Gottfredson, 1997). 
FSIQ proponents claim that scores below the global level have less interpretative 
power primarily because of poor reliability (McDermott, Fantuzzo & Glutting, 1990; 
McDermott, Fantuzzo, Glutting, Watkins & Baggaley, 1992).  They also cite the stability 
of global scores in cases where index or subtest scores fluctuate from one test 
administration to the next and argue that FSIQ, as a representation of g, is the only valid 
and reliable means for characterizing cognitive ability.  As evidence for this latter claim, 
they cite studies documenting the relationship between g and overall life success, 
including educational and occupational attainment, marital satisfaction, and emotional 
health (Buckholdt, 2001; Gottfredson, 1997; Kranzler, 2001).  
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From this perspective, variation in task performance at the subtest level represents 
the effect of sources of error and the individual task’s inability to accurately reflect the g  
that is thought to be accurately reflected in the global FSIQ.  In Gottfredson’s (1998) 
words:  
Because every mental test is “contaminated” by the effects of specific mental 
skills, no single test measures only g.  . . . The scores from IQ tests . . . contain 
some “impurities.” . . . For most purposes, these “impurities” make no practical 
difference, and g and IQ can be used interchangeably. (p. 26) 
As thus intimated by Gottfredson (1998), the interpretation of FSIQ requires 
adherence to the assumption that individual performance across the multiple subtests and 
indexes from which it is derived is relatively uniform.  In clinical practice, we know that 
this is not always the case, and some have argued against the interpretation of FSIQ in 
cases of extreme index and subtest score variability (e.g., Fiorello, Hale, McGrath, Ryan 
& Quinn, 2001; Kaufman & Flanagan, 2009; Prifitera, Weiss, & Saklofske, 1998). 
Proponents of a multiple factors approach to interpretation utilize index scores 
that are derived from combinations of subtests thought to measure the same cognitive 
capacities (Kaufman & Flanagan, 2009; Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009).  Unlike 
Gottfredson and like-minded theorists, these proponents of index and subtest-level 
interpretation view variations in task performance as potentially clinically meaningful 
rather than merely “contamination” of g.  Those who favor this position suggest that the 
index and subtest score variability demonstrated by many children reduces both the 
descriptive and predictive validity of FSIQ (Fiorello et al., 2007). 
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 Like FSIQ interpretation, index or factor-level interpretation also relies on the 
assumption that individuals utilize in similar manner closely related groups of cognitive  
functions when completing index-specific tasks.  However, this proposition is not 
supported by the literature, which suggests that intelligence test indexes measure multiple 
cognitive functions, even within a specific index (Flanagan & Kaufman, 2009; Hale & 
Fiorello, 2004; McCloskey, 2009).  Recognizing this literature base, some psychologists 
advocate for subtest interpretation in place of or as a supplement to index and FSIQ 
interpretation (Weiss, Saklofske, Prifitera & Holdnak, 2006).   
Several models for subtest-level interpretation exist.  Sattler (2001) provided a 
procedure similar to that initially proposed by Kaufman (1979) for identifying cognitive 
strengths and weaknesses based on deviations from the arithmetic mean of a group of 
subtests.  Flanagan and Kaufman (2009) offered a model derived from Kaufman’s (1979; 
1994) “intelligent testing” approach. The model applies both nomothetic and idiographic 
procedures in the interpretation of global, index, and subtest scores.  While they do not 
promote individual subtest interpretation on the grounds that single subtests are not 
psychometrically sound, Flanagan and Kauffman do recommend the interpretation of 
subtest clusters based on their shared abilities identified in the Catttel-Horn-Carroll 
(CHC) theory of the structure of cognitive abilities.  
Like those who subscribe to subtest profile interpretation, advocates of the 
process approach to psychological assessment also propose that index and FSIQ 
interpretation can mask clinically meaningful information and lead to inaccurate 
characterizations of cognitive ability (Kaplan, 1988; Kaplan, Fein, Morris, Kramer & 
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Delis, 1999; McCloskey, 2009a; McCloskey & Maerlender, 2005).  With foundations in a 
Lurian neuropsychological theory (Luria, 1973), the process approach is  
based on the work of Kaplan and colleagues (Kaplan, 1988; Kaplan et al., 1999) and 
involves interpretation beyond the level of subtest performance (i.e., average, below 
average, etc.).  Subtest scores are conceptualized as products of multiple sources of 
influence, including the format of the tasks, the unique cognitive processes and abilities 
utilized by the child, and the specific strategies used by the child to perform the task 
(McCloskey & Maerlender, 2005). 
McCloskey and Maerlender (2005) have identified the following interconnected 
principles which serve as the basis for the process approach and for understanding the 
type of information cognitive assessment yields: (1) intelligence subtests are 
multifactorial tasks that involve a complex interaction of many neuropsychological 
processes; (2) identifying the cognitive processes that contribute to successful or 
unsuccessful task performance allows for the identification of the source of cognitive 
deficiencies and strengths and the establishment of brain-behavior relationships; (3) the 
cognitive skills utilized during task completion may vary from one individual to another 
based on how that individual responds to the input, internal processing, and output 
demands of the task; (4) careful and systematic observation of performance during 
completion of a subtest is necessary for understanding how the individual achieved 
his/her score; and (5) observations during task completion, including analyses of error 
patterns, can lead to confirmation or refutation of hypotheses regarding the origin of 
deficits. 
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Several models of intelligence-test interpretation represent extensions of Kaplan’s 
(1988) process approach.  Hale and Fiorello (2004) suggested an interpretative cycle that  
begins with analysis of global levels of performance and includes subtest interpretation 
when significant variability renders FSIQ invalid (Fiorello et al., 2007).  The focus of 
their idiographic assessment is the cognitive processes necessary for task completion.  
Recognizing the multifactorial nature of subtests, they recommend conducting demands 
analyses for subtests representing cognitive strengths and weaknesses.  The demands 
analysis includes an assessment of the input, processing, and output demands of each 
subtest for the individual child.   
McCloskey (2009) also provided a neuropsychologically oriented interpretative 
levels model focusing on the interpretation of clinical clusters, subtests, items, and the 
cognitive capacities required to complete tasks.  Like Hale and Fiorello (2004), he 
stressed the importance of careful observation during assessment to facilitate an 
understanding of the unique cognitive processes utilized by individuals during the 
completion of subtest tasks. 
Cognitive Capacities Measured by the WISC-IV Subtests 
The WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) is designed for use with children ages 6 years, 0 
months through 16 years, 11 months.  The instrument is composed of 15 subtests, 10 core 
and 5 supplemental.  The 10 core subtests yield 4 indexes: the Verbal Comprehension 
Index (VCI), Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI), Working Memory Index (WMI), and 
Processing Speed Index (PSI).  The FSIQ composite is derived from the 10 core subtests.  
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Also provided for select subtests are process scores, which allow further examination of 
the primary and secondary cognitive processes involved in task completion.  
 The VCI consists of three core subtests (Vocabulary, Similarities, and 
Comprehension), and two supplemental subtests (Word Reasoning and Information).  
The PRI also consists of three core subtests (Block Design, Picture Concepts, and Matrix 
Reasoning), and one supplemental subtest (Picture Completion).  The WMI includes two 
core subtests (Digit Span and Letter-Number Sequencing), and one supplemental 
(Arithmetic).  The PSI is composed of two core subtests (Coding and Symbol Search), 
and one supplemental subtest (Cancellation).  Table 1 provides a brief description of the 
WISC-IV core and supplemental subtests. 
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Table 1  
 
Descriptions of WISC-IV Core and Supplemental Subtests 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Subtest Description 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Vocabulary The examinee names pictures and provides verbal 
definitions of words. 
Similarities The examinee verbally describes the concrete and abstract 
similarities between sets of concepts or objects. 
Comprehension The examinee provides oral responses to questions 
requiring common sense and knowledge of conventional 
standards of behavior. 
Information  The examinee provides oral responses to questions 
assessing general knowledge. 
Word Reasoning The examinee identifies a target word based on a series of 
clues. 
Block Design The examinee constructs three-dimensional block designs 
using a model within the allotted time. 
Matrix Reasoning The examinee performs a matrix analogy task requiring 
determination of part-whole relationships.   
Picture Concepts The examinee identifies the common characteristic among 
two or three rows of pictures. 
Picture Completion The examinee views a series of pictures and identifies the 
essential part they are missing within the allotted time. 
Digit Span The examinee repeats a series of orally presented digits 
both backwards and forward.  
Letter-Number Sequencing The examinee is required to listen to a series of numbers 
and letters and then repeat them in ascending and 
alphabetical order. 
Arithmetic The examinee mentally solves a series of orally presented 
arithmetic problems within the allotted time. 
Coding The examinee uses a grid to copy geometrical symbols 
within a specified time limit.  
Symbol Search The examinee scans an array of symbols to determine the 
presence or absence of a target symbol within a specified 
time limit. 
Cancellation  The examinee scans an array of pictures presented in 
random and nonrandom fashion and identifies target 
pictures within the allotted time.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Subtests in italics are supplemental. 
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 Several authors (McCloskey, 2009; Miller, 2007; Miller & Hale, 2008) have 
identified both primary and secondary cognitive and neuropsychological processes likely 
assessed by the WISC-IV subtests.  The primary cognitive processes are those constructs 
that the subtest is designed to measure. Secondary processes are the cognitive constructs 
that may not be the focus of the assessment task but that may support successful task 
execution.  Poor subtest performance can result from lack of effective use of primary or 
secondary capacities or from a combination of both.  As provided by McCloskey (2009) 
and Miller and Hale (2008), Table 2 provides a brief overview of the hypothesized 
primary and secondary cognitive capacities assessed by the WISC-IV subtests. 
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Table 2 
 
Cognitive Capacities Assessed by the WISC-IV Subtests 
 
 WISC-IV Core and Supplemental Subtests 
Cognitive 
Capacity 
VC SI Co In WR BD MR Pcn Pcm Ds Ls Ar Cd SS Ca 
Executive 
Functions 
S S S  S S P P S S S S S S S 
Memory 
Functions 
P 
S  P P    S P P P    
Auditory 
Perception 
S S S S      S S S    
Language 
Functions 
P  P      S       
Reasoning 
Ability 
 P P  S P P P P       
Visuomotor 
Processing 
Speed 
     S       P S  
Visual 
Perception 
     P S P S    S S S 
Visual 
Processing 
Speed 
             P P 
 
Note. P = Primary; S = Secondary 
 
 
 
 
 Executive functions refer to the broad category of cognitive processes responsible 
for cueing and directing mental activities and behaviors, such as attention, effort, 
problem-solving, and response inhibition.  Executive functions appear to be a key  
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mediator in the successful performance of all WISC-IV subtests.  Memory functions refer 
to working memory as well as to the initial encoding of and retrieval of information from 
long-term storage. 
 Auditory perception refers to the broad array of cognitive capacities involved in 
the accurate perception and discrimination of speech sounds, the comprehension of 
grammar and syntax, and the efficient registration of auditory information.  Language 
functions refer to both expressive and receptive language capabilities.  The term 
reasoning, in the context of subtest performance, refers to the examinee’s ability to think 
abstractly about verbally mediated information and nonmeaningful, visual stimuli. 
 Visual perception refers to the broad category of visual processes involved in the 
accurate representation of visual stimuli and the ability to detect similarities and 
differences in visual stimuli.  Visual processing speed refers to the examinee’s ability to 
efficiently integrate visual and motor processes when completing tasks such as Block 
Design. 
Rationale for and Criticisms of Subtest-Level Interpretation 
Proponents of subtest-level analysis point out not only that global scale 
interpretation obscures clinically meaningful information but also that this approach has 
little diagnostic or treatment validity (Lezak, 1988).  In contrast, numerous studies have 
demonstrated the link between cognitive processes and academic skills (Flanagan, Ortiz, 
Alfonso & Mascolo, 2002; Floyd, Evans & McGrew, 2003) and various forms of 
psychopathology (Hain, Hale, & Kendorski, 2009; Hale & Fiorello, 2004).  Furthermore, 
it is apparent that examination of cognitive strengths and weaknesses,  
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which can be accomplished only via subtest and item-level analysis, is necessary for 
understanding a child’s learning problems and for developing interventions (Fiorello et 
al., 2001;  Hale & Fiorello, 2004; Hale, Fiorello, Kavanagh, Hoeppner, & Gaither, 2001). 
Nevertheless, subtest-level interpretation continues to be discouraged by those 
who adhere to psychometric traditions on the basis that subtests are less reliable than 
index or global scores (McDermott et al., 1990; McDermott et al., 1992) and more 
susceptible to measurement error (Macmann & Barnett, 1997).  In contrast to this view, 
McCloskey (2009a) pointed out that the perception of subtest instability may be the result 
of misguided conceptions of reliability and not of actual properties of subtests.   
Despite evidence of the multifactorial nature of intelligence tests, traditional 
psychometric methods for estimating intelligence-test reliability continue to rely on the 
questionable assumptions that Wechsler subtests measure specific, stable cognitive traits 
and that re-administrations of a subtest should produce the same results if the test is 
reliable.  In the traditional psychometric model, variations in test-retest performance that 
may be related to factors specific to the internal mental states of the examinee and/or the 
application of the examinee’s mental capacities with the specific format of the test 
materials are attributed to measurement error.  Any variations from a static level of 
performance on first and subsequent administrations of the same task therefore are 
viewed as measurement error.  Literal interpretation of these sources of variation as 
“measurement error” that produces undesirable and/or uninterpretable consequences is 
pointed to as evidence that the task is an unreliable source of information about the 
examinee’s cognitive capacities.  
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Neuropsychology of Practice-Related Changes in Intelligence-Test Performance  
The proposition that variable levels of change in performance from time 1 to time 
2 are the result of undesirable measurement error is not consistent with the 
neuropsychological literature base that has examined performance on repeated 
administrations of a task.  Numerous studies suggest that increases in cognitive 
efficiency, or what is commonly referred to as the practice effect, contribute to increases 
in performance on repeated measures of cognitive functioning (Catron & Thompson, 
1979; Kaufman, 2003; Matarazzo, Carmody, & Jacobs, 1980).  From a 
neuropsychological perspective, these increases in performance can be explained as 
resulting from changes in brain functioning that promote the learning of novel tasks and 
more efficient execution of previously learned skills.  This proposition is consistent with 
neuroimaging studies indicating differences in cerebral activation patterns based on both 
task demands and previous exposure to the task (Bever & Chiarello, 1974; Gold, Berman, 
Randolf, Goldberg & Weinberger, 1996; Henson, Shallice & Dolan, 2000; Martin, Wiggs 
& Weisberg, 1997).   
Clearly articulated in the seminal work of Goldberg and Costa (1981), the 
novelty-routinization hypothesis of hemispheric specialization suggests that the right 
hemisphere is more actively involved in the processing of ambiguous or novel 
information while the left hemisphere specializes in the processing of automatic, familiar 
information for which specific mental representations exist.  A key phrase in the  
preceding sentence is “more actively involved,” as Goldberg and Costa were not 
implying task-specific localization but rather that both hemispheres are interconnected, 
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with the psychological process involved determining the degree of hemisphere 
involvement (Hale & Fiorello, 2004). In addition, Goldberg (2001) notes that executive 
processes are more relevant for right hemisphere functions than for left hemisphere ones. 
Goldberg and Costa’s (1981) novelty-routinization hypothesis is based on the 
earlier work of  Luria (1973), who suggested hemispheric specialization based on the 
internal organization and representation of information (Majovski, 1997).  Luria also 
postulated that cognitive skill acquisition involves a gradual shift from anterior to 
posterior regions of the brain.  Luria described three principal functional units in the 
brain.  The first functional unit includes the reticular system and related structures and is 
responsible for the maintenance of tone or waking (Hale & Fiorello, 2004).  The second 
functional unit is devoted to receiving, storing, and analyzing information and is housed 
in the posterior occipital, parietal, and temporal regions of the brain.  Luria’s third 
functional unit is the frontal lobes, which are responsible for the regulation of almost all 
aspects of mental activity (Hale & Fiorello, 2004). 
Among Luria’s principal functional units, the initial stages of learning a new task 
are characterized by greater use of anterior brain regions, specifically the frontal lobes.  
However, once a skill is mastered, posterior regions of the brain become more important 
in performing the learned task (Goldberg, 2001; Goldberg, Harner, Lovell, Podell, & 
Riggio, 1994; Hale & Fiorello, 2004). 
Using neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), numerous researchers have attempted 
to correlate cerebral blood-flow patterns with right-left, anterior-posterior transitions 
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during novel and familiar task completion and under conditions of repeated task 
exposure.  Cerebral blood-flow levels are assumed to correlate with neural activity 
(Goldberg, 2009).   
In a study designed to investigate practice-induced improvements in performance, 
Raichle et al. (1994) used PET to study activation patterns during the naïve and practiced 
performance of a verbal-response selection task.  In the naïve condition of the study, 
participants were asked to say an appropriate verb for each visually presented noun from 
a list of 40 nouns.  In another condition of the study, called the practice condition, a 
different group of subjects were given the list of nouns, asked to identify a verb to go 
with each noun on the list, and given 15 minutes to rehearse the noun-verb association list 
they generated.  In the novel condition, subjects experienced the naïve condition first and 
then were given a new list of 40 nouns and asked to generate a verb for each, as in the 
naïve condition.  Results indicated that the pattern of activation present during the naïve 
condition, the anterior cingulate, the left prefrontal and left posterior temporal cortices, 
and the right cerebellar cortices, all but disappeared during the practice condition and was 
partially reactivated during the novel condition.  Furthermore, in contrast to the naïve and 
novel conditions, the practice condition was associated with significantly greater 
activation in the left medial occipital region. 
Martin, Wiggs, and Weisberg (1997) studied the regional cerebral blood-flow 
patterns associated with learning two different sets of meaningful words, nonsense words, 
real objects, and nonsense objects.  Performance during the first presentation of items 
was associated with activation of the right mesiotemporal structures, but this activation 
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decreased during the second presentation.  Activation of the left mesiotemporal structures 
was evident during both learning trials.  According to Goldberg (2009), the finding of 
decreased right hemisphere activation during the second presentation of novel items 
suggests that cerebral activation patterns are related to general characteristics of learning 
and not to the learning of specific items. In other words, even though the Trial 2 items 
were different, the nature of the task was the same and thus no longer novel to the 
participants.   
The findings of Martin, Wiggs, and Weisberg (1997) and Raichle et al. (1994) 
also provide compelling information regarding the localization of language functions in 
the brain.  Contrary to traditional conceptions of language as the primary responsibility of 
the left hemisphere, both studies indicate that linguistic information is also processed in 
the right hemisphere, provided that the task requiring linguistic processing is novel. 
 In studies examining cerebral blood flow patterns associated with facial and 
symbol recognition, novelty was associated with right but not left activation of the 
hippocampal and parahippocampal structures (Tulving, Markowitsch, Craik, Hiabib & 
Houle, 1996) and right occipital regions (Henson et al., 2000).  In contrast, a study 
examining perceptual decision making with easily recognizable items indicated greater  
activation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal regions (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini & 
Ungerleider, 2004).   
 In a study designed to examine the right-left and anterior-posterior transition, 
Gold et al. (1996) examined cerebral blood-flow patterns associated with learning a task 
requiring delayed response and alternation.  Not surprising given the executive demands 
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of this task, results indicated frontal lobe activation during both the early and later stages 
of task learning.  However, this activation was significantly greater during early- as 
compared to late-stage learning.  Also evident was a shift from right to left frontal lobe 
activation as participants became more familiar with the task.  
 The findings of Gold et al. (1996) are similar to those of Shadmehr and Holcomb 
(1997), who demonstrated greater right prefrontal activation during early but not later 
stages of learning a complex motor skill.  Later stage learning was associated with more 
significant activation of the left posterior parietal cortex.  Similarly, the results of Staines, 
Padilla, and Knight (2002) suggest both a right to left and an anterior to posterior 
transition during the learning of a visuomotor task.   
 Variability in brain function can account in a meaningful way also for decreases 
in performance when retested with the same task.  As suggested earlier, executive 
functions mediate important performance variables, including sustained attention, effort, 
and motivation.  Minor variations in retest performance can result from variation in the 
use of these executive-function capacities (Barkley, 2006; Denkla, 2007; McCloskey, 
2009a; McCloskey, 2009b; McCloskey, Perkins, & VanDiviner, 2009). 
Ineffective performance at time 1 can reduce a score, and this lowering effect can 
be overcome by more efficient use of executive functions on the second testing.  
Conversely, performance decreases from time 1 to time 2 can result from inefficient 
engagement of executive functions.  While the effect of variations in cognitive efficiency 
would produce effects similar those proposed in a traditional psychometric model of 
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reliability, the source of variability is attributed to neuropsychologically based brain 
states rather than to a confluence of random error factors.   
Studies Addressing Practice-Related Changes in Intelligence Test-Retest 
Performance 
Several variables, including the test-retest interval, task novelty, motor speed 
requirements, and examinee age (Kaufman, 2003; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; 
Shatz, 1981), have been examined as potential mediators of the degree of practice effects 
observed on intelligence tests.  To assess the differential influence of practice effects at 
different test-retest intervals, Catron and Thompson (1979) administered the WAIS 
(Wechsler, 1955) on two occasions to four groups of college students at 1-week, 1- 
month, 2-month, and 4-month intervals.  Results indicated that the largest increases in 
Verbal (VIQ), Performance (PIQ), and FSIQ occurred at 1 week and the smallest at 4 
months.  The average standard score increases in VIQ at 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, and 
4 months were as follows: 4.7, 1.8, 2.3, and .8.  The average standard score increases in 
PIQ and FSIQ at 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, and 4 months were as follows: 11.4, 9.8, 
8.7, and 8.0 and 8.0, 5.7, 5.4, and 4.2, respectively.   
 To investigate the differential impact of practice effects on Wechsler’s 
performance and verbal scales, Kaufman (2003) analyzed the test-retest data for the 
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI;Wechsler, 1967), 
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler, 
1989), Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised (WISC-R; Wechsler, 1974), 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991), 
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and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981).  Results 
indicated higher test-retest standard score gains in PIQ and FSIQ versus VIQ.  With mean 
age intervals ranging from 5 to 50 years and mean test-retest intervals of 3 to 11 weeks, 
the median gain on VIQ for these instruments was 3.2, while the median gains for PIQ 
and FSIQ were 9.0 and 6.8, respectively. 
A pattern of differential practice effects similar to those observed on the Wechsler 
scales has also been demonstrated on other intelligence tests.  The average gain of 
approximately 7 points on the Wechsler FSIQ noted by Kaufman (2003) also has been 
observed for the global index scores for the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children 
(KABC; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), McCarthy Scales of Children’s Abilities (MSCA; 
McCarthy, 1972), Differential Ability Scales (DAS; Elliot, 1990), Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scales-Fourth Edition (SB-IV; Thorndike, Hagen & Sattler, 1986), and 
Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993). 
The average gain on the Simultaneous Processing scale of the KABC (Kaufman 
& Kaufman, 1983), which resembles Wechsler’s PIQ, is 6.5 compared to 2.5 on the 
Achievement scale, which is similar to the VIQ (Kaufman, 2003).  On the SB-IV  
(Thorndike, Hagen & Sattler, 1986), gains on the Abstract/Visual Reasoning scale 
averaged 7.5 to 8 points, while gains on the Verbal Reasoning scale averaged 5 points.  
Finally, on the KAIT (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993), practice effects produced an average 
7-point gain in Fluid IQ compared to a 4.5 gain in Crystallized IQ, which is derived from 
subtests similar to those that make up Wechsler’s VIQ. 
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Traditional Conceptions of Reliability 
In contrast to performance changes based on brain-function adaptation to tasks, 
the traditional psychometric conception of test reliability can be broadly defined as the 
consistency of the measure or the extent to which the measure yields the same results on 
repeated trials (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) offer a more 
complete definition of reliability as the extent to which measurements can be replicated 
with different examiners, with alternative instruments designed to measure the same 
thing, and under circumstances where minor variations exist in the conditions of 
measurement.  The current methods for conceptualizing, calculating, and presenting 
intelligence-test reliability data are based on test theory concepts, such as regression to 
the mean, error variance, and true scores.   
Traditional psychometric theory is used when estimating the reliability of testing 
instruments.  Traditional psychometric theory posits that scores on testing instruments are 
composed of two elements: true score variance and error variance.  A true score is a 
hypothetical concept and, as such, can never be obtained or directly measured, but rather 
can be approximated through multiple administrations of the same test.  The true score, 
therefore, can be conceptualized as the mean of the distribution of scores one would  
achieve if tested repeatedly with the same instrument (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  The 
true score can also be viewed as one’s true ability level or actual level of the 
characteristic of interest (e.g., true level of intelligence). This true score is based not only 
on measurement error, but also in the mathematical fact that as obtained scores deviate 
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more from the mean, subsequent scores will show regression to the mean (Anastasi & 
Urbina, 1997).   
Anastasi and Urbina (1997) broadly define error variance as any influencing 
factor that is not relevant to the purpose of the testing instrument.  Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994) identified content sampling as the primary source of measurement error 
within a test and also suggested that variance can result from multiple random factors, 
including examinee fatigue and administration errors.   
Within the context of traditional psychometric theory, error, regardless of its 
source, is important to consider and quantify because as the amount of measurement error 
increases, the reliability of the instrument decreases.   
An important underlying assumption of traditional psychometric theory is that all 
variance in an individual’s performance in multiple administrations of the same test is the 
result of measurement error and not variation in the mental capacities that are being 
assessed.  This assumption is critical for consideration in that it limits greatly the utility 
of the psychometric theory conception of reliability when attempting to describe human 
performance patterns on intelligence tests.   
Methods for Estimating Reliability 
There are three conceptual approaches to determining the reliability of an 
instrument that are discussed in the traditional psychometric literature and in test 
manuals: internal consistency, test-retest, and interrater reliability. 
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Internal consistency. 
Internal consistency methods provide an estimation of the consistency of scores 
across test items assumed to measure the same construct.  Internal consistency reliability 
provides an indication of both test stability and the precision with which the construct of 
interest has been measured (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  Methods to determine internal 
consistency reliability include alternate forms and the split-half method, for which a third 
method of internal consistency has been derived called coefficient/Cronbach’s alpha.   
In the alternate forms approach, two instruments measuring the same attribute and 
containing nonoverlapping sets of items are administered to the same individuals on two 
occasions, and their scores are correlated (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; McDonald, 1999). 
To be considered alternate and equivalent, the two test forms must measure the same trait 
to the same extent and must be standardized on the same population. 
The second method for determining internal consistency, referred to as the split-
half method, involves creating two equivalent forms of a test measuring the same skill by 
dividing the test in half.  Both tests are then administered, and the scores are correlated as 
in the alternate forms approach.  If the test design is such that the easier items are 
presented first and the more difficult items last, the use of procedures to ensure that both 
forms of the test contain easy and difficult items will be necessary.  
Coefficient/Cronbach’s alpha is a variant of the split-half method.  It is derived by  
averaging all possible split-half correlations within the items that comprise a subtest 
(Cronbach, 1951). 
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Test-retest. 
Test-retest reliability is generally acknowledged as a measure of test score 
consistency over a short period of time, such as 2 weeks, while stability refers to the 
consistency of scores over long periods of time (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  However, the 
test manuals for most widely used intelligence tests, including the Wechsler Scales 
(Wechsler, 1997, 2002, 2003), refer to estimates of reliability based on short test-retest 
intervals as stability coefficients.  To calculate stability coefficients, test developers 
administer the test to a subset of individuals from the standardization sample on two 
occasions and then correlate the two sets of test scores. 
Interrater. 
Interscorer or interrater reliability refers to the extent to which different assessors 
provide similar scores or ratings when using the same instrument or when observing the 
same person (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  There are primarily two methods for 
determining interrater reliability: the correlational method and percentage of agreement. 
The correlational method is similar to that employed when determining test-retest 
reliability.  Two individuals administer the same instrument, and the scores they assign 
are then correlated. 
Generally speaking, the percentage-of-agreement approach involves calculating 
the proportion of agreement between ratings by the same person on the same instrument 
at different times or by different persons on the same instrument.   
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Current Procedures for Estimating Intelligence-Test Stability and Reliability  
Because an individual’s true score is not known, reliability cannot be directly 
quantified.  To address this problem, traditional psychometric theory proposes 
mathematical constructs to quantitatively estimate and represent the amount of error 
associated with observed scores.  The three most common of these mathematical 
constructs are the reliability coefficient, the standard error of measurement, and the 
confidence interval. 
Reliability coefficients and correlational procedures. 
In the case of a completely reliable test, the obtained score is equal to the true 
score.  When an obtained score does not equal the true score, the difference is attributed 
to measurement error and regression to the mean.  Since the true score cannot be known, 
the difference between two administrations of the same test are thought to be an estimate 
of the difference between an obtained score and a true score.  For a given sample of 
examinees, the average of the product of the difference between the z score values of the 
two scores of all examinees produces a correlation coefficient that is referred to as the 
reliability coefficient. 
Reliability coefficients are derived from correlational procedures. Correlation is a 
statistical procedure used to measure and describe the relationship between two variables 
or scores (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2007).  Correlational methods 
provide us with information regarding the direction and degree of the relationship 
between two scores.  In terms of direction, correlations can be either positive or negative.  
Positive correlations indicate that the two scores or variables move in the same direction;  
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as one variable increases, so does the other.  Negative correlations indicate an inverse 
relationship between scores; as one score increases, the other decreases.  
Correlation coefficients can range from -1.00 to 1.00.  A coefficient of .00 would 
indicate no relationship between scores, while a coefficient of 1.00 indicates a perfectly 
consistent relationship between scores (all scores are either positively or negatively 
related in an identical manner) (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  The correlation coefficient 
can represent an index of reliability; a coefficient of .00 would indicate total unreliability, 
reflected in a lack of relationship between scores, while a coefficient of 1.00 would 
indicate perfect reliability, that is, a perfectly consistent relationship between scores.  A 
test with a reliability coefficient of .80, for example, contains less measurement error and 
is more reliable than a test with a reliability coefficient of .40.  For standardized-
assessment instruments, test developers and researchers usually consider reliability 
coefficients of .90 to be excellent, while those in the .80’s are good and those in the .70’s 
are adequate; however, these descriptive classifications vary depending on the type and 
use of the scores being correlated (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  
Standard error of measurement and confidence intervals.  
 The standard error of measurement (SEM) is a mathematical formula constructed 
around the reliability coefficient to quantify in a more specific manner the estimate of the 
amount of error associated with test scores  (Psychological Corporation, 2004).  The SEM 
represents the standard deviation of the distribution of scores around the hypothetical true 
score (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  A large SEM indicates a high level of error 
associated with observed score efforts to approximate the true score and therefore reflects  
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poor reliability.  A small SEM indicates a small amount of error associated with observed 
score efforts to approximate the true score and therefore reflects a high level of 
reliability. 
 Confidence intervals represent a range of score values based on the SEM within 
which an individual’s true score is contained (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994).  The size of the confidence interval varies based on the degree of 
certainty that the true score is actually contained within the confidence-interval score 
range.  Confidence intervals are a way to represent the effect that unreliability has on 
score estimation.  They illustrate the fact that error is present in all scores. 
Procedures for Calculating Test-Retest and Internal Consistency Reliability 
Test-retest and internal consistency reliability for the Wechsler Scales (Wechsler, 
1997; 2002; 2003) are calculated using the Pearson Product-Moment and Spearman-
Brown correlational formulas, respectively. 
The Pearson Product-Moment correlational formula used to calculate stability 
coefficients is as follows (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994):   
 
r = (Zx)(Zy) 
             n 
 
Lowercase r is the symbol for the correlation coefficient, and it is derived by dividing the 
sum of the product of the z scores by n.  Note that, in this case, (Zx) is the time 1 score 
and (Zy) is the time 2 score. 
 With the exception of the processing speed subtests, whose reliability is 
represented using the stability coefficient only, internal consistency for the Wechsler 
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Scales subtests and composites was calculated using the split-half method.  Application 
of the split-half procedure is not appropriate for speeded subtests because of their 
structure, which prevents the creation of two equivalent half-tests (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994).  For instance, consider the WISC-IV Coding subtest, which requires the child to 
use a grid to correctly match as many numbers and shapes as possible within a 2-minute 
time limit.  Because the number of correct responses within the 2-minute time period will 
vary between children, it is not possible to adequately split the subtest into two equivalent 
halves. 
The internal-consistency reliability coefficient is derived by correlating the total 
scores for the two half-tests.  Unlike stability coefficients, internal-consistency 
coefficients are based on the whole normative sample.  The Spearman-Brown formula 
recommended by Guilford (1954) and Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) is used because it 
corrects for the loss of items during the split-half procedure.  When using Pearson’s 
formula, loss of test items can lead to lower estimations of reliability.  The Spearman-
Brown procedure allows for prediction of what the reliability coefficients would be if 
entire subtests were used in the correlational formula.  The Spearman-Brown correction 
formula is as follows (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994):   
rnn  =   Krtt 
                      1 + (k – 1)rtt 
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The estimated reliability coefficient is  rnn , k is the number of items on the half-test 
divided by the number of items on the original test, and rtt  is Pearson’s r before 
correction. 
Procedures for Calculating Confidence Intervals  
 The first step in calculating confidence intervals is to establish the level of 
confidence based on the degree of certainty preferred.  The test manuals for the most 
commonly used intelligence tests typically report confidence intervals for full scale and 
composite scores based on 90% and 95% confidence levels.  Confidence intervals 
correspond to z scores and percentages of area under the normal curve. For example, the 
95% confidence interval covers 95% of the normal curve and is associated with a z score 
of -1.96 and +1.96.  When the confidence level is set at 95%, we can say that there is a 
95% chance that the individual’s true score falls within the interval of scores calculated.  
So, if the confidence interval associated with an IQ score of 100 is 96-105, classical test 
theory would have us conclude that the individual’s true IQ score is somewhere between 
96 and 105.   
After the confidence level is selected, there are two procedures for calculating 
confidence intervals.  Before describing these procedures, it is important to note that 
when subtest reliability estimates are high, which is typically the case for the Wechsler 
Scales, the confidence intervals established by both procedures show little difference 
(Psychological Corporation, 2004). 
  The formula for the first method is based on obtained scores and the SEM and is 
as follows (Sattler, 2001): 
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P% Confidence Interval = Observed Score ± Zp(SEM) 
P% is the desired confidence level, Zp is the z score associated with the confidence level, 
and SEM is the standard error of measurement.  The upper limit of the confidence interval 
is computed by adding the product Zp(SEM) to the observed score, while the lower limit 
is computed by subtracting the product from the observed score. 
An alternative method is based on the estimated true score and the standard error 
of estimation (SEE) (Dudek,1979; Glutting, McDermott & Stanley, 1987).  The SEE is 
the average standard deviation of true scores around an obtained score (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994).  It is calculated using the formula proposed by Stanley (1971): 
SEE = SD (rxx) √1-rxx 
SEE is the standard error of estimation, SD is the theoretical standard deviation of the 
composite or subtest, and rxx  is the subtest or composite reliability coefficient. 
 The estimated true score is calculated using the following formula (Sattler, 2001): 
T = rxx x + (1 - rxx) X 
T is the estimated true score, rxx is the reliability of the test composite, x is the obtained 
score, and X is the mean of the test.  The estimated true score is used in this formula 
because it is hypothesized to be closer to the mean of the test than an individual’s 
observed test score.  And when used with the SEE, the estimated true score is a correction 
for true-score regression to the mean (Psychological Corporation, 2004).  
When confidence intervals are calculated using the estimated true score rather 
than the observed score, they can, in theory at least, provide a zone of expectation within 
which scores from re-administrations of the test are expected to fall.  This is  
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because, according to the concept of regression to the mean, individuals’ performances 
with retesting should more closely approximate the mean of the scale and their true score.  
The hypothetical concept of regression to the mean states that when there is a less-than-
perfect correlation between two administrations of the same test, extreme scores (i.e., 
scores farther from the group mean) tend to move toward the mean on the second 
administration (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2007).  Of course, confidence intervals have 
predictive value only when reliability coefficients are high and SEM’s are low.  With 
increased measurement error come wider confidence intervals and decreased ability to 
accurately predict retest performance.  
Factors Affecting Reliability Estimates Based on Correlational Methods 
Numerous factors associated with examinee performance patterns and the 
characteristics of examiners, examinees, the instrument being used, and the testing 
environment can affect reliability estimates calculated using correlational procedures.  
The following is a brief review of these factors.   
Restriction of range. 
Restriction of range refers to a situation in which the range of scores used to 
estimate the reliability of an instrument is not representative of the full range of scores in 
the population (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; McCloskey, 1990).  Restriction of range may 
lead to underestimations of reliability. 
 To illustrate, consider a group of students chosen as the standardization sample on 
a test measuring word knowledge.  If the majority of these students earned scaled scores 
between 7 and 9, with the full range of possible scores being 1-16, we can assume that  
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this is a restricted range; testing of additional students in the population will likely 
produce a number of scaled scores lower than 7 and higher than 9, making the test appear 
unreliable. 
 Outliers. 
Similar to scores that are restricted in range, outliers also can have an impact on 
estimations of reliability.  Outliers are individual scores that are substantially lower or 
higher than the scores obtained by the majority of the group.  When using correlational 
methods to calculate test reliability based on the scores of a group of individuals, the 
presence of only one score that is substantially higher or lower than the others can lead to 
an underestimation of reliability. 
 Test length. 
In general, the longer the test, the more reliable it is (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  Consequently, in traditional psychometric orientations, 
many argue that global scores are more reliable, as they are comprised of many more 
items than are subtest or factor scores.   
Guessing. 
Guessing occurs when individuals respond arbitrarily to test items.  Even when 
guessing results in correct answers, it introduces error into scores and can reduce 
estimates of reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Variations within the testing situation. 
Variations within the testing situation refers to any behaviors by examiners during 
testing that introduce error into testing procedures.  Examples include examiner scoring  
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errors and incorrect responses as a result of the examinee not understanding directions 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  
Limitations of Correlational Procedures When Used to Estimate Intelligence-Test 
Reliability 
Use of correlational procedures to estimate intelligence-test reliability is well 
documented in the literature, including studies examining short-term test-retest reliability 
(Psychological Corporation, 2004) and long-term stability of IQ scores among different 
demographic subgroups (Canivez & Watkins, 1999) and learning-disabled populations 
(Kaye & Baron, 1987).  However, there are several limitations to this statistical approach 
related to the quantity and quality of information it provides test consumers regarding 
test-retest score variability.  These limitations are described next. 
Use of a mean score to represent test score variability. 
Close inspection of the formula for calculating Pearson’s correlation, r = Sum 
(Zx)(Zy)/n, reveals that this formula actually provides an averaging of variability in test-
retest scores.  The question posed here is whether an average is the best quantitative 
method for representing variability in performance from time 1 to time 2.  This 
descriptive statistic not only is sensitive to outliers but also, when used to describe large 
data sets, provides only limited information about the distribution of scores from which it 
was calculated. 
Correlation and causation. 
Correlation provides an estimate of the degree and direction of the relationship 
between two test scores but does not provide information regarding cause and effect.  In  
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other words, correlation coefficients can tell us that two test scores are related, or not 
related, but they do not tell us why.  As an example, consider a situation in which the 
test-retest reliability coefficient for a test measuring vocabulary knowledge is .20, 
suggesting low reliability.  This low reliability coefficient tells us that the students in the 
test-retest sample did not perform the same during both administrations of the test but 
gives no indication as to whether the variable performance was due to measurement error, 
practice effects, etc.  
Inflation of error estimates. 
Estimates of error derived from reliability coefficients tend to be inflated because 
any change in an individual’s score from time 1 to time 2 that may be the result of 
increases in cognitive efficiency is added to the measurement error unless every student 
in the sample shows similar changes (Salvia & Ysseldyke, 2004).  Stated another way, 
because reliability estimates are based on groups of individuals and not on individual 
scores, changes in scores as a result of practice effects or other cognitive factors as 
previously suggested are interpreted as measurement error. 
Coefficient of determination. 
Related to practice effects, another example of how classical test theory and the 
correlational approach may overestimate measurement error and underestimate changes 
in test performance due to changes in cognitive efficiency can be found in the concept of 
coefficient of determination.  Calculating the coefficient of determination is another way 
to assess the amount of error attached to test-retest reliability coefficients.  To calculate 
the coefficient of determination, one must simply square the correlation coefficient.  The  
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coefficient of determination provides an indication of the amount of variability in Score 2 
that can be attributed to Score 1.   
For example, if the test-retest correlation coefficient for the WISC-IV arithmetic 
subtest is .79, the coefficient of determination would be .62.  This means that 62% of the 
variance in the retest score can be attributed to the original test score, while 38% of the 
variance, according to classical test theory, is attributed to error, even if the variability is 
due to meaningful differences in the use of cognitive capacities rather than to random 
fluctuations. 
Alternatives to the Traditional Psychometric Theoretical Conception of Reliability 
Item response (Rasch & Lord, 1960) and generalizability theory (Cronbach, 
Rajaratnam & Gleser, 1963), also known as G-theory, were developed as alternatives to 
the classical test theory model of reliability.  The primary purpose of item response 
theory (IRT) and its derivatives (Rasch Model; Wright & Masters, 1982; Faceted Rasch 
Model; Linacre, 1989; Multidimensional Item Response Theory Models; McDonald, 
1967)  is to estimate the underlying theoretical trait that is presumed to contribute to an 
individual’s observed response on a measure (Suen & Lei, 2007).  This is accomplished 
via the use of a probabilistic model of response, the logistic ogive model (Suen & Lei, 
2007). 
In contrast, the focus of G-theory (Cronbach, Rajaratnam & Gleser, 1963), like 
classical test theory, is the estimation of reliability for whole tests.  However, there are 
some important theoretical differences between G-theory and classical test theory, most 
notably in their conceptualizations of the components of observed scores.  As noted  
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previously, in classical test theory an individual’s observed score is hypothesized to 
consist of both true score and error variance.  As stated in Suen and Lei (2007), in G-
theory, the observed scores of all examinees on all items of the instrument are 
conceptualized as consisting of a universe score, µ, which is the theoretical mean of all 
the item scores in the universe of items, the deviation of the examinees’ average item 
responses from µ, other deviations from µ, and random error. 
Within the G-theory model, other deviations or sources of variance are referred to 
as facets, which may include different items, raters, times, or forms.  Reliability estimates 
based on these different facets are calculated directly via the common analysis of 
variance statistical method (Suen & Lei, 2007).  The advantages of G-theory are that it 
enables the consideration of multiple sources of error simultaneously and does not 
assume linearity, as is the case with traditional psychometric approaches.  However, in 
circumstances where multiple sources of error are analyzed, very complex and lengthy 
statistical formulas are required to calculate reliability coefficients and SEMs.  As is the 
case with traditional psychometric methods, G-theory does not consider the 
neuropsychological implications of exposing the brain to information that it can use to 
modify performance when presented with the same or similar information at a later time.  
The complexity of calculation methods and a reliance on hypothesized theoretical 
constructs, much like traditional psychometric theory, suggest that implementation of G-
theory is likely to obscure rather than to clarify the issue of reliability  for clinicians who 
use the Wechsler Scales on a regular basis. 
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Alternatives to Correlational Procedures for Estimating Test Reliability 
Decision consistency models. 
The use of decision-consistency models is well established in the literature on 
reliability estimations for criterion-referenced tests (Subkoviak, 1980; Traub & Rowley, 
1980; Van Der Linden, 1980). Criterion-referenced instruments use a specific criterion to 
evaluate individual performance.  For example, for a test measuring word knowledge, 
raw scores at or above 65 may be classified as passing scores while scores below 65 are 
failing. 
In contrast to norm-referenced instruments where reliability estimates are based 
solely on test score variability from the first testing to subsequent testing, actual raw 
score variability between test and retest is less relevant when determining criterion-
referenced test reliability (Traub & Rowley, 1980). What is important and what must be 
considered in a reliability assessment is the precision with which the instrument yields 
similar classifications according to the set criterion when repeated testing occurs.  In the 
previous example, reliability could be assessed as the regularity with which individuals 
who were classified as passing on trial 1 also received a passing score on trial 2.   
The basic procedures for applying a decision-consistency model are relatively 
simple and straightforward.  Using data from two administrations of the same test, one 
can calculate the percentage of agreement for individuals who are classified the same on 
both test administrations according to the designated cut score.  Decision-consistency 
models often use statistical procedures, such as chi square and coefficient kappa, to  
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evaluate the degree of agreement between test and retest scores (Swaminathan, 
Hambleton, & Algina, 1974). 
Use of Decision-Consistency Models with Norm-Referenced Assessments  
Leach, Kaplan, Dymtro, Richards and Proulx (2000) utilized a decision-
consistency model when calculating and presenting test-stability data for the Kaplan-
Baycrest Neurocognitive Assessment (KBNA).  The KBNA is an instrument commonly 
used by neuropsychologists to assess the integrity of cognitive functioning in the areas of 
attention, verbal fluency, spatial processing, reasoning and conceptual shifting, and 
immediate and delayed memory.  In addition to reliability coefficients calculated using 
traditional correlational procedures, the KBNA authors present decision-consistency 
percentages indicating the percentage of the standardization sample whose classification 
range (Below Average, Equivocal, Average) on each subtest did not change from test to 
retest.  
In another variation of a decision-consistency model, McCloskey (1990) 
compared an agreement grid to traditional correlational procedures when estimating the 
interrater reliability of two early-childhood-behavior rating scales.  Design of the grid 
involved the calculation of three agreement percentages: (1) an identical ratings 
percentage showing the percentage of exact agreement between first and second rating; 
(2) an increased ratings percentage showing the percentage of increased ratings from time 
1 to time 2; and (3) a decreased ratings percentage indicating the percentage of decreased 
ratings from the first to second rating. 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficients for both scales were calculated by correlating 
time 1 and time 2 ratings.  The correlation coefficient for the first scale was .59, 
suggesting poor consistency between time 1 and time 2 ratings.  However, the agreement 
grid indicated a much higher level of decision agreement as evidenced by the overall 81.6 
identical ratings percentage between the first and second ratings.  McCloskey (1990) 
attributed the large discrepancy between the correlation coefficient and identical ratings 
percentage to a restricted range of ratings, which negatively influences the former but not 
the latter. 
For the second rating scale, both the correlation coefficient (.84) and identical 
ratings percentage (76%) between the first and second ratings were high.  The high 
percentage of increased ratings on the second scale (21.5%) may have been the result of 
expectancy effects or the tendency of raters to provide higher ratings over time in the 
absence of actual increases in target behavior (McCloskey, 1990). 
McCloskey (1990) reported several advantages of an agreement grid over 
correlational procedures when attempting to establish the reliability of behavior rating 
scales.  Among these is the agreement grid’s ability to yield accurate information about 
degree of test-retest score agreement regardless of the score distribution.  McCloskey also 
suggested that agreement grids can provide valuable information about the nature of test-
retest score disagreements and facilitate a better understanding of the extent to which 
expectancy effects accounted for increases in ratings from time 1 to time 2. 
The modified decision-consistency model illustrated by McCloskey (1990) could 
be adapted to examine the degree of consistency between WISC-IV subtest scores in a  
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test-retest condition.  Values for the degree of negative change, no change, and positive 
change could be calculated and compared with hypothetical results based on traditional 
psychometric theory, such as true-score estimates, and/or based on the 
neuropsychological literature related to practice effects. 
A modified decision-consistency model approach to the analysis of test reliability 
has a number of potential advantages over traditional psychometric methods, including a 
more complete view of the variability of scores from time 1 to time 2 that does not mask 
important patterns in the movement of scores. 
Conclusion 
Despite its demonstrated value in diagnosis and intervention planning, subtest-
level interpretation of intelligence tests continues to be criticized on the basis that 
subtests have poor reliability and poor interpretative power.  However, it may be that 
perceptions of subtest instability are the result of misguided conceptualizations of and 
poor methods for representing test reliability and are not related to the actual properties of 
subtests. 
The current psychometric model of test reliability assumes that intelligence tests 
measure specific cognitive constructs that are stable over time and, as such, that 
individual performance should not vary between test and retest.  In cases where test-retest 
performance results in improvement that is not consistent across all individuals in the 
sample, it is assumed that this inconsistency is the result of measurement error and not 
systematic variance from sources other than those that are the focus of the assessment. 
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Viewing all forms of variance in performance from time 1 to time 2 as undesired 
measurement error that reduces the reliability of the test is not consistent with the 
neuropsychological literature base indicating that increases in performance are due to 
improved cognitive efficiency, commonly referred to as practice effects, that contribute 
in an expected and meaningful way to increases in performance on repeated measures of 
cognitive functioning (Kaufman, 2003; Goldberg, 2001; Matarazzo et al., 1980; Catron & 
Thompson, 1979). From a neuropsychological perspective, these increases in 
performance can be explained as resulting from changes in brain functioning that 
promote the learning of novel tasks and more efficient execution of familiar tasks.  
Rather than eschew these brain-state changes as measurement error that detracts from a 
test’s usefulness and reliability as a source of information about examinee performance, 
test developers should develop and employ methods that enable clinicians to recognize 
and quantify expected changes in task performance in a manner that is meaningful and 
clinically interpretable. 
Decision-consistency models offer a basis for the development of methods for 
conducting more meaningful reliability analyses that may prove superior to traditional 
psychometric methods in terms of clinical utility.  A variation of the basic decision-
consistency model was proposed by McCloskey (1990).  This method involves the 
classification of the difference between time 1 and time 2 testing as negative change, no 
change, or positive change and has the advantage of enabling the clinician to 
simultaneously view and understand how, and the extent to which, scores do or do not 
change on repeated administrations. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Given the perceived inadequacies of the traditional psychometric model to offer 
realistic, clinically meaningful information about variation in test performance based on 
repeated administration of subtest tasks, the present study sought to offer an alternate 
means of understanding and interpreting the concept of subtest reliability using a 
variation of a decision-consistency model incorporating neuropsychologically based 
knowledge to establish expected WISC-IV subtest score patterns of change in 
performance from time 1 to time 2 and to offer a means to test the utility of this 
neuropsychologically based performance model for clinical practice. 
Research Questions 
Question 1:  To what extent does a neuropsychologically based performance model fit 
WISC-IV subtest test-retest data?  Extrapolating from the findings in the literature, the 
following patterns of performance variation from time 1 testing to time 2 testing are 
hypothesized: 
 Hypothesis 1A:  For a majority of cases, subtests that primarily involve retrieval 
from long-term storage or association with stored knowledge (Vocabulary, Information, 
Word Reasoning, Similarities) will yield score differences that reflect no change in 
performance or minor fluctuations in performance of -1 or +1 resulting from minor 
variations in cognitive efficiency.  Cases showing change will be biased toward a 
progression effect rather than a regression effect; that is, increases will outnumber 
decreases even in situations where regression to the mean would predict performance 
decreases or no change. 
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Hypothesis 1B:  For a majority of cases, subtests that primarily involve the initial 
registration of and manipulation of verbal information in mind (Digit Span Forward and 
Backward, Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Arithmetic) will vary in degree and 
frequency depending on the specific nature of the subtest task.  Subtests that involve the 
holding and manipulation of nonmeaningful, decontextual information (Digit Span 
Forward, Digit Span Backward, Digit Span) will distribute relatively equally around a 
central tendency of no change with relatively fewer but equal numbers of cases 
demonstrating positive and negative change both above and below the mean.  Tasks that 
primarily involve the initial registration and manipulation of verbal information that is 
more contextual and meaningful (Arithmetic and, to a lesser degree, Letter-Number 
Sequencing) will demonstrate a pattern of performance closer to that of tasks involving 
retrieval from long-term storage. 
 Hypothesis 1C:  For a majority of cases, subtests that primarily involve novel 
problem solving (Matrix Reasoning, Picture Concepts, Block Design, Picture Concepts) 
or processing speed applied to simple but relatively novel tasks (Coding, Symbol Search, 
Cancellation) will yield score differences that reflect positive changes in performance, 
reflecting a greater progression than regression effect.  Score decreases will be similar in 
magnitude both in cases where time 1 scores were above the mean and in cases where 
time 1 scores were below the mean due to the greater effects of cognitive inefficiencies, 
thereby negating the effect of regression to the mean thought to be caused by random 
distribution of measurement error both above and below the mean.  
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Hypothesis 1D:  When considered in total, the test-retest results will support an 
alternate model of performance change consistent with the neuropsychological literature 
on practice effects and cognitive efficiency and inefficiency rather than a model of no 
change or fluctuations in the form of regression to the mean based on the traditional 
psychometric conception of reliability. 
Question 2:  Does a neuropsychologically oriented performance-consistency method 
offer any possible advantages over traditional psychometric methods in the type of 
information it provides test consumers regarding WISC-IV subtest performance patterns? 
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Chapter 2 
Method 
Participants 
This study utilized the archival data set from the WISC-IV standardization sample 
used to calculate the test-retest reliability for this instrument.  As reported in the WISC-IV 
Integrated Technical and Interpretative Manual (Psychological Corporation, 2004), the 
participants included 243 children (52.3% female & 47.7% male) between the ages of 6 
and 16 years selected to be representative of the total WISC-IV standardization sample.  
Each participant was assessed on two occasions (mean test-retest interval 32 days) using 
all 15 subtests of the WISC-IV.  Other demographic characteristics of the sample are as 
follows: 74.1% Caucasian, 7.8% African American, 11.1% Hispanic, and 7% other 
racial/ethnic origin.  Parent education levels for the participants were as follows: 4.9%, 0-
8 years; 9.1%, 9-11 years; 25.9%, 12 years; 36.2%, 13-15 years; and 23.9%, greater than 
or equal to 16 years (Psychological Corporation, 2004). 
Measures 
The WISC-IV yields standard and scaled scores, base rates, percentile ranks, and 
age equivalents. Subtests have a mean scaled score of 10 and standard deviation of 3.  
The mean standard score for the four indexes is 100, and the standard deviation is 15.  
The WISC-IV Integrated Technical and Interpretative Manual (Psychological 
Corporation, 2004) provides detailed information regarding the instrument’s validity and 
reliability.  The WISC-IV has been shown to demonstrate adequate content, criterion-
related, and construct validities.  As reported in the WISC-IV Integrated Technical and 
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Interpretative Manual (Psychological Corporation, 2004), Tables 3 and 4 show the 
average SEM, reliability coefficients, and corrected stability coefficients for the subtests, 
composite scales, and process scores for the total sample.  
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Table 3  
Average Reliability Coefficients, SEM, and Corrected Stability Coefficients for WISC-IV 
Subtests for the Total Sample 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Subtest   rxx SEM    r 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Block Design .86 1.13 .82 
Similarities .86 1.13 .86 
Digit Span .87 1.07 .83 
Picture Concepts .82 1.29 .76 
Coding .85 1.20 .84 
Vocabulary .89 1.00 .92 
Letter-Number Sequencing .90 .97 .83 
Matrix Reasoning .89 .99 .85 
Comprehension .81 1.31 .82 
Symbol Search .79 1.36 .80 
Picture Completion .84 1.20 .84 
Cancellation .79 1.38 .79 
Information .86 1.16 .89 
Arithmetic  .88 1.05 .79 
Word Reasoning .80 1.34 .82 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. rxx = overall average reliability coefficient; r= stability coefficient.  Overall average reliability and stability 
coefficients were calculated using the formula for Fisher’s z transformation recommended by Silver and Dunlap (1987). 
Stability correlations were corrected for variability of the standardization sample using the procedures recommended by 
Allen and Yen (1979) and Magnusson (1967).  Average SEMs were calculated by averaging the sum of the squared 
SEMs for each age group and obtaining the square root of the result. 
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Table 4 
Average Reliability Coefficients, SEM, and Corrected Stability Coefficients for WISC-IV 
Process Scores and Composite Scales for the Total Sample 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Process Score   rxx   SEM   r
a 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Digit Span Forward  .83   1.24   .76 
Digit Span Backward  .80   1.37   .74 
Cancellation Random  .70   1.66   .72 
Cancellation Structured .75   1.51   .76 
Verbal Comprehension  .94   3.78   .93 
Perceptual Reasoning  .92   4.15   .89 
Working Memory  .92   4.27   .89 
Processing Speed  .88   5.21   .86 
FSIQ    .97   2.68   .93 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. rxx = overall average reliability coefficient; r= stability coefficient.  Overall average reliability and stability 
coefficients were calculated using the formula for Fisher’s z transformation recommended by Silver and Dunlap   
(1987). Stability correlations were corrected for variability of the standardization sample using the procedures 
recommended by Allen and Yen (1979) and Magnusson (1967).  Average SEMs were calculated by averaging the sum 
of the squared SEMs for each age group and obtaining the square root of the result.  Internal consistency coefficients 
for the indexes ranged from .88 for the PSI to .97 for the FSIQ.  However, it is important to note that the internal 
reliability estimates for the PSI subtests are actually the test-retest reliability estimates; internal consistency estimates 
are not calculated for processing-speed subtests.  Symbol Search and Cancellation had the lowest internal reliability 
estimates (.79), while Letter-Number Sequencing had the highest (.90).  Internal consistency estimates for the process 
scores range from .70 for Cancellation Random to .84 for Block Design No Time Bonus. 
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The average SEM is lowest for Letter-Number Sequencing (.97) and highest for 
Cancellation (1.38).  For the composite scales and process scores, SEM is lowest for 
FSIQ (2.68) and highest for PSI (5.21) and Cancellation Random (1.66).  Test-retest 
coefficients for the total sample ranged from .93 for the FSIQ and VCI to .86 for the PSI.  
Vocabulary had the highest test-retest reliability estimate (.92), and Picture Concepts had 
the lowest (.76).   
Research Design and Statistical Procedures 
 A modified decision-consistency model was used to categorize test-retest results 
by degree of change from time 1 to time 2.  Using the time 1 and time 2 test scores of 243 
cases from the standardization test-retest reliability study, the following procedures were 
carried out to complete the analyses: 
1.  For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, an Actual Difference 
score was calculated for each case by subtracting the obtained time 1 score from 
the obtained time 2 score.   
2. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, a Predicted Time 2 score 
was calculated using the following formula: 
 x2 = X2 + (x1 – X1) * rx1x2 * (sdx2 / sdx1) 
where  x2 = Time 2 score 
 x1 = Time 1 score 
 X1 = Mean of Time 1 scores (set at 10 for all subtests) 
 rx1x2 = the correlation between Time 1 and Time 2 scores 
sd1 = the standard deviation of Time 1 scores (set at 3) 
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sd2 = the standard deviation of Time 2 scores (set at 3) 
  It is important to note that the formula for predicting a time 2 score from a 
time 1 score is identical to the formula for estimating the true score since the term 
(sd2/sd1) is equal to 1 because both standard deviations were set at the known population 
value of 3.  It is also important to note that the formula incorporates the concept of 
regression to the mean in that time 1 scores well below the mean of 10 are predicted to 
increase toward the mean whereas time 1 scores well above the mean of 10 are predicted 
to decrease toward the mean.  
3. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, a Predicted Difference 
score was calculated for each case by subtracting the obtained time 1 score from 
the Predicted Time 2 score calculated in step 2. 
4. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, frequency distributions 
were obtained for the Actual Difference scores and the Predicted Difference 
scores and tabled together for comparison and analysis. 
5. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, the sample of 243 cases 
was divided into two groups to test the traditional psychometric conception of 
regression to the mean that was incorporated in the formula a Predicted Time 2 
score. 
a. The LTE group consisted of all cases where the time 1 score was less than 
10.  This group comprised the cases that would be predicted to show no 
change in score at time 2 or, in extreme cases, to show a positive gain in 
score at time 2 due to the effect of regression to the mean.  Also included  
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with this group were cases where the time 1 score was 10 and the time 2 
score was less than 10 for reasons stated later. 
b. The GTE group consisted of all cases where the time 1 score was greater 
than 10.  This group comprised the cases that would be predicted to show 
no change in score at time 2 or, in extreme cases, to show a decrease in 
score at time 2 due to the effect of regression to the mean.  Also included 
with this group were cases where the time 1 score was 10 and the time 2 
score was greater than 10 for reasons stated later. 
c. Cases scoring at the mean of 10 at time 1 presented a challenge in terms of 
group classification.  Because all of these cases were at the mean at time 1, 
they were predicted to remain at the mean at time 2.  If the T2-T1 
Predicted Difference score of 0 was not identical to the Actual Difference 
score, then these cases would not be conforming to the expected pattern of 
regression to the mean.  Because the analysis was attempting to determine 
the number of cases that did not conform to the expected pattern of 
regression to the mean, it was decided to maintain these cases in the 
analysis by dividing them based on the Actual Difference score.  Cases 
earning time 1 scores of 10 that reflected a negative Actual Difference 
score were included in the LTE group because they were expected to 
remain the same rather than to decrease, and cases earning a time 1 score 
of 10 that reflected a positive Actual Difference score were included in the 
GTE group because they were expected to remain the same rather than to  
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increase.  Only the cases earning time 1 scores of 10 that reflected no 
change in Actual Difference score were eliminated from the analysis.  In 
all cases, the number of cases eliminated from the analysis was typically 
less than 10% of the total sample.  This case assignment procedure 
represented a bias based on time 2 scores that ultimately was in favor of 
the traditional psychometric model, as other means of including or 
excluding the cases earning scores of 10 at time 1 would have further 
increased the proportions of cases not conforming to the expected no 
change/regression to the mean performance pattern. 
6. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, Predicted Difference 
scores were assigned to one of three score-change categories:   
Negative Change (-), No Change (0), and Positive Change (+).   
7. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, Actual Difference scores 
were assigned to one of three score-change categories:  Negative Change (-), No 
Change (0), and Positive Change (+).   
8. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, a 2 x 3 cross-tabulation 
table was generated indicating frequency counts of the three score-change 
categories for Actual Difference scores and Predicted Difference scores for the 
cases assigned to the LTE group.  The frequencies in the 2 x 3 table were 
subjected to a chi-square analysis to determine goodness of fit between the Actual 
and the Predicted Difference proportions. 
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9. For each WISC-IV subtest and selected process scores, a 2 x 3 cross-tabulation 
table was generated indicating frequency counts of the three score-change 
categories for Actual Difference scores and Predicted Difference scores for the 
cases assigned to the GTE group.  The frequencies in the 2 x 3 table were 
subjected to a chi-square analysis to determine goodness of fit between the Actual 
and the Predicted Difference proportions. 
10. In many instances, the frequency counts for Predicted Difference scores were 0 
for the negative-change and positive-change categories.  Chi-square analyses 
require a minimum of five cases in each category in order for a valid analysis to 
be completed.  In situations where the score-change category count was 0 for the 
Predicted Difference score, five cases were removed from the No Change 
category and placed in the category with the 0 count, thereby enabling the 
completion of all chi-square analysis.  This alteration of the data represents a bias 
in favor of a nonsignificant finding in that increasing the category frequency for 
cells with 0 counts made it more likely that the proportions in each category 
would be similar, leading to a nonsignificant chi-square value.  
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Chapter 3 
Results 
 Cross-tabulation analyses were conducted to determine the frequency of score 
differences between time 2 and time 1 administration for each WISC-IV subtest and 
select process scores.  The Actual Difference scores were then compared with the 
Predicted Difference scores calculated using the regression model described in Chapter 2.   
 Table 5 shows the frequency distributions for the Actual and Predicted 
Differences between time 2 and time 1 performance on the WISC-IV Verbal subtests.  
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Table 5 
 
Frequency Distributions of Actual and Predicted T2 – T1 Differences for Each WISC-IV  
Verbal Subtest 
 
Subtest 
(n) 
Difference 
Vocabulary (n = 242) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual     2 18 46 81 63 19 8 5    
Predicted        239 3       
Information (n = 243) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6  +7-9 
Actual    4 2 16 27 86 60 31 11 4 2   
Predicted       9 227 7       
Similarities (n =239) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual    1 4 14 32 67 60 32 20 8  1  
Predicted       24 191 24       
Comprehension (n = 234) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual   4 2 10 18 35 61 46 34 17 5 2   
Predicted      1 34 167 32       
Word Reasoning (n = 243) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual 1    6 18 31 49 56 44 25 8 2 3  
Predicted       43 167 33       
 
 
 
 
 For all Verbal subtests with the exception of Comprehension, the Predicted 
Difference scores did not exceed -1 or +1.  Across all Verbal subtests, a higher frequency 
of students demonstrated no change or positive scaled-score change versus negative 
scaled-score change.  With the exception of the Word Reasoning subtest, where the 
largest number of students (n = 56) demonstrated a scaled-score increase of +1, the  
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performance of the majority of examinees did not change from time 1 to time 2.  For all 
subtests, the retest performance of the majority of examinees fell between -1 and 1, 
suggesting that this score band may prove useful in predicting WISC-IV Verbal retest 
performance using the alternative reliability model presented here.  Word Reasoning 
produced the most test-retest score variability, with three examinees demonstrating score 
improvement of +6 and one examinee showing a decrease of -7 scaled-score points.  A 
fairly large discrepancy between Actual and Predicted score frequencies was evident for 
all subtests.  The only exception was Comprehension, where the Actual frequency of 
examinees showing a difference of -1 varied from the prediction model by only 1 (n = 35 
versus 34).  Most notable in the table is the prominence of Actual Difference increases 
over decreases that are more consistent with a neuropsychologically based performance 
model than with the traditional psychometric model. 
Table 6 shows the frequency distributions for the Actual and Predicted 
Differences between time 2 and time 1 performance on the WISC-IV Working Memory 
subtests. 
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Table 6 
 
Frequency Distributions of Actual and Predicted T2 – T1 Differences for Each WISC-IV 
Working Memory Subtest and Process Score 
 
Subtest 
(n) 
Difference 
Digit Span (n = 241) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6  +7-9 
Actual    1 9 16 34 68 56 28 17 8 2 2  
Predicted      2 42 149 48       
 Digit Span Forward (n = 243 ) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual   3 5 12 21 21 73 42 29 16 14 6  1 
Predicted      3 39 148 53       
Digit Span Backward (n = 237) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual    10 8 28 23 74 22 35 14 15 5 2 1 
Predicted      6 65 96 66 4      
Letter-Number Sequencing (n = 235) 
 -7-9 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual 1   1 6 21 42 65 46 21 18 8 6   
Predicted       41 164 29 1      
Arithmetic (n = 133) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual    10 8 28 23 74 22 35 14 15 5 2 1 
Predicted      6 65 96 66 4      
 
 
 
 
 For all Working Memory subtests, the Predicted Difference scores did not exceed 
-2 or 2.  However, a large discrepancy between Actual and Predicted score frequencies 
was evident for all subtests.  The only exception was Letter-Number Sequencing, where 
the Actual frequency of examinees showing a difference of -1 varied from the prediction 
model by only 1 (n = 42 versus 41).  A greater number of examinees demonstrated no  
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change or positive scaled-score change on the Working Memory subtests.  Across all 
subtests, the largest number of examinees demonstrated no scaled-score change between 
time 1 and time 2.  Performance on all Working Memory subtests was characterized by 
higher frequencies of Actual Difference increases over decreases that are more consistent 
with a neuropsychologically based performance model than with the traditional 
psychometric model. 
Table 7 shows the frequency distributions for the Actual and Predicted 
Differences between time 2 and time 1 performance on the WISC-IV Perceptual 
Reasoning subtests. 
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Table 7 
 
Frequency Distributions of Actual and Predicted T2 – T1 Differences for Each WISC-IV 
Perceptual Reasoning Subtest 
 
Subtest 
(n) 
Difference 
Block Design (n = 240) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6   +7-9 
Actual     3 7 24 63 54 34 25 20 8 1 1 
Predicted      1 51 143 44 1      
Matrix Reasoning (n = 239) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual    5 8 9 29 72 47 32 23 8 5 1  
Predicted       26 196 17       
Picture Concepts (n = 234) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual  1  2 9 24 27 39 46 37 21 18 7 2 1 
Predicted      1 41 149 41 2      
Picture Completion (n = 243) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual      4 13 46 49 57 37 23 6 5 3 
Predicted       26 191 26       
 
 
 
 
For all Perceptual Reasoning subtests, the Predicted Difference scores did not 
exceed -2 or 2.  As with the Verbal and Working Memory subtests, though, the Predicted 
scores based on the regression model had limited predictive validity.  Only on Matrix 
Reasoning did the Predicted regression frequency closely approximate the Actual 
frequency (n = 26 versus 29).  Across all Perceptual Reasoning subtests, a higher 
frequency of students demonstrated no change or positive scaled-score change versus 
negative scaled-score change.  On both Block Design and Matrix Reasoning, the highest  
USING A PERFORMANCE CONSISTENCY MODEL 59 
retest score frequency was 0, n = 63 and 72, respectively.  For Picture Concepts, the 
largest number of examinees demonstrated retest scaled-score increases of +1 (n = 46), 
while for Picture Completion, the most common rate of improvement was +2 (n = 57).  
Overall, Picture Completion showed the highest rates of score variability and score 
improvement.  Consistent with the neuropsychologically based performance model, 
across all subtests there were higher frequencies of Actual Difference increases over 
decreases. 
Table 8 shows the frequency distributions for the Actual and Predicted 
Differences between time 2 and time 1 performance for the WISC-IV Processing Speed 
subtests and process scores. 
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Table 8 
 
Frequency Distributions of Actual and Predicted T2 – T1 Differences for Each WISC-IV 
Processing Speed Subtest  
 
Subtest 
(n) 
Difference 
Coding (n = 231) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual      11 25 39 46 51 27 20 7 2 3 
Predicted       35 178 18       
Symbol Search (n = 233 ) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6  +7-9 
Actual  1  4 6 11 24 43 46 45 24 14 10 3 2 
Predicted       49 155 28 1      
Cancellation (n =234) 
 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7-9 
Actual   2 2 5 14 27 34 50 41 30 13 11 4 1 
Predicted       50 145 35 4      
 
 
 
 
 For all Processing Speed subtests, the Predicted Difference scores did not exceed 
-1 or 2.  However, for all subtests, there was a large discrepancy between the frequencies 
predicted by the regression model and the Actual Difference frequencies.  Across all 
Processing Speed subtests, a greater number of examinees demonstrated no scaled-score 
change or positive scaled-score change versus negative scaled-score change.  Unlike the 
subtests contained in the other WISC-IV indexes, all Processing Speed subtests showed 
higher frequencies of positive versus negative scaled-score change.  The Processing 
Speed subtests also yielded the highest rates of score improvement and highest 
frequencies of significant test-retest score variability; for each subtest, 12-15 participants  
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demonstrated score improvement of 5 or more scaled-score points.  As with the subtests 
in the other domains, performance on the Processing Speed subtests was characterized by 
higher frequencies of Actual Difference increases over decreases. 
Tables 5 through 8 present Actual and Predicted score frequency data for the total 
sample without clear indication of the values of the time 1 scores.  To more clearly 
examine the effectiveness of the psychometric model in predicting the time 2 score, it is 
necessary to specify the value of the time 1 score in relation to the mean of the scale.  The 
regression model will predict score increases for more extreme time 1 scores below the 
mean and score decreases for more extreme time 1 scores above the mean. 
 Tables 9 through 12 show the percentages of  time 2-time 1 score differences that 
reflect regression (-), progression (+), or no change (0).  Also provided are the 
percentages of time 2-time 1 score differences that the regression model predicts would 
result in score regression, progression, or no change.  The data are grouped by time 1 
standard score ranges and time 2 score change categories using the procedures outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
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Table 9 
 
Actual and Predicted Difference Score Percentages by Score Change Category for Each 
WISC-IV Verbal Subtest for the LTE and GTE Groups 
 
 
Subtest (n) 
T1 Scaled Scores 
LTE 10 
 T1 Scaled Scores 
GTE 10 
 
Subtest (n) 
Vocabulary  
(n = 102) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Vocabulary 
(n = 125) 
     Predicted 0% 99% 1%  0% 100% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 31% 28% 40%  27% 30% 43%      Actual 
Information 
(n = 105  ) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Information 
(n = 119) 
     Predicted 0% 93% 7%  9% 91% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 18% 27% 55%  25% 33% 42%      Actual 
Similarities 
(n = 95) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Similarities 
(n = 131) 
     Predicted 0% 74% 26%  21% 79% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 18% 21% 61%  26% 26% 48%      Actual 
Comprehension 
(n = 101) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Comprehension 
(n = 121) 
     Predicted 0% 66% 34%  34% 66% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 24% 24% 53%  37% 21% 42%      Actual 
Word Reasoning 
(n = 103) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Word Reasoning 
(n = 132) 
     Predicted 0% 67% 33%  40% 60% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 14% 22% 67%  32% 14% 54%      Actual 
 
Note. LTE = time 1 standard score below the mean of 10. GTE = time 1 standard score above the mean of 10.  Time 1 
scores at the mean were divided between the two groups using the procedure described in Chapter 2.  Group n counts 
vary because of deletion of cases based on the case assignment procedures described in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
For all Verbal subtests, both the LTE and GTE groups demonstrated higher 
percentages of Actual score progression versus Actual score regression and lower 
percentages of no change than predicted. The percentages of Actual score progression  
USING A PERFORMANCE CONSISTENCY MODEL 63 
were higher for the LTE than the GTE group for all subtests except Vocabulary (40% 
versus 43%).  Across all subtests, both groups demonstrated higher percentages of Actual 
score progression than were predicted.  The LTE group demonstrated higher rates of 
Actual versus Predicted score regression for all Verbal subtests.  For the GTE group, 
percentages of Predicted score regression were generally lower than percentages of 
Actual score regression.  The one exception was Word Reasoning, where the model 
predicted 40% regression and the actual was 32%. The GTE group demonstrated a higher 
rate of Actual score regression than that of the LTE group for all subtests except 
Vocabulary (31% versus 27%).  The LTE group demonstrated higher percentages of 
Actual score progression than those of the GTE group for all subtests except Vocabulary 
(40% versus 43%), 
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Table 10   
 
Actual and Predicted Difference Score Percentages by Score Change Category for Each 
WISC-IV Working Memory Subtest and Process Score for the LTE and GTE Groups 
 
 
Subtest (n) 
T1 Scaled Scores 
LTE 10 
 T1 Scaled Scores 
GTE 10 
 
Subtest (n) 
Digit Span 
(n = 115) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Digit Span 
(n = 117) 
     Predicted 0% 53% 47%  45% 55% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 22% 27% 51%  30% 24% 46%      Actual 
DS Forward 
(n = 102) 
- 0 +  - 0 + DS Forward 
(n = 136) 
     Predicted 0% 45% 55%  34% 66% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 13% 32% 57%  36% 26% 38%      Actual 
DS Backward 
(n = 104) 
- 0 +  - 0 + DS Backward 
(n = 121) 
     Predicted 0% 28% 72%  66% 34% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 20% 31% 49%  40% 25% 35%      Actual 
Letter Number 
(n = 89) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Letter Number 
(n = 136) 
     Predicted 0% 63% 37%  36% 64% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 25% 24% 51%  36% 25% 39%      Actual 
Arithmetic 
(n = 51) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Arithmetic 
(n = 65) 
     Predicted 0% 52% 48%  33% 67% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 16% 19% 65%  35% 28% 37%      Actual 
 
Note. LTE = time 1 standard score below the mean of 10. GTE = time 1 standard score above the mean of 10.  Time 1 
scores at the mean were divided between the two groups using the procedure described in Chapter 2.  Group n counts 
vary because of deletion of cases based on the case assignment procedures described in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
The LTE group demonstrated higher percentages of Actual score progression 
versus regression across all subtests.  With the exception of Digit Span Backwards, where 
the Actual progression-regression percentages were 35% and 40%, respectively, the GTE 
group also demonstrated higher percentages of progression versus regression.  However,  
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it should be noted that, in contrast to subtests in other domains, the Working Memory 
subtests produced progression and regression percentages for the GTE group that were 
close in value.  Likewise, with the exception of Digit Span Backwards, the GTE 
Predicted regression percentages closely approximated the Actual regression percentages.  
For Letter-Number Sequencing, the Actual and Predicted regression percentages were 
equivalent.  Actual progression and regression percentages were higher than predicted for 
all subtests in the LTE group.  Overall, the LTE group showed higher percentages of 
score progression and the GTE group demonstrated greater percentages of regression. 
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Table 11  
 
Actual and Predicted Difference Score Percentages by Score Change Category for Each 
WISC-IV Perceptual Reasoning Subtest for the LTE and GTE Groups 
 
 
Subtest (n) 
T1 Scaled Scores 
LTE 10 
 T1 Scaled Scores 
GTE 10 
 
Subtest (n) 
Block Design  
(n = 100) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Block Design 
(n = 131 ) 
     Predicted 0% 55% 45%  51% 49% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 10% 20% 70%  18% 26% 56%      Actual 
Matrix Reasoning 
(n = 107  ) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Matrix Reasoning 
(n = 118) 
     Predicted 0% 47% 53%  27% 73% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 20% 28% 52%  25% 24% 51%      Actual 
Picture Concepts 
(n = 91) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Picture Concepts 
(n = 135) 
     Predicted 0% 47% 53%  40% 60% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 24% 13% 63%  30% 14% 56%      Actual 
Picture Completion 
(n = 95) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Picture Completion 
(n = 142) 
     Predicted 0% 73% 27%  21% 79% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 3% 17% 80%  10% 17% 73%      Actual 
 
Note. LTE = time 1 standard score below the mean of 10. GTE = time 1 standard score above the mean of 10.  Time 1 
scores at the mean were divided between the two groups using the procedure described in Chapter 2.  Group n counts 
vary because of deletion of cases based on the case assignment procedures described in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
Both the LTE and GTE groups demonstrated higher percentages of Actual score 
progression than regression for all subtests.  The LTE group demonstrated higher 
percentages of Actual score progression than the GTE group across all subtests.  Actual 
regression percentages were higher for the GTE group than for the LTE group.  The 
Predicted percentages of progression were lower than the Actual percentages for all  
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subtests for both groups.  The LTE group showed higher percentages of Actual versus 
Predicted regression, while the GTE group demonstrated lower percentages of regression 
than predicted.  Picture Completion showed the highest percentages of score progression, 
with 80% of the LTE group and 73% of the GTE group demonstrating improvement.  For 
both groups, the percentages of Predicted no score change were much higher than the 
percentages of Actual score change.  For all subtests, the percentages of score 
progression were higher for the LTE group than for the GTE group.  However, the GTE 
group showed higher percentages of regression for all subtests. 
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Table 12  
 
Actual and Predicted Difference Score Percentages by Score Change Category for Each 
WISC-IV Processing Speed Subtest for the LTE and GTE Groups 
 
 
Subtest (n) 
T1 Scaled Scores 
LTE 10 
 T1 Scaled Scores 
GTE 10 
 
Subtest (n) 
Coding 
(n = 94) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Coding 
(n = 131) 
     Predicted 0% 79% 21%  31% 69% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 17% 15% 68%  15% 15% 70%      Actual 
Symbol Search 
(n = 80) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Symbol Search 
(n = 147) 
     Predicted  0% 63% 37%  44% 56% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 16% 18% 66%  22% 16% 62%      Actual 
Cancellation 
(n = 103) 
- 0 +  - 0 + Cancellation 
(n = 128) 
     Predicted 0% 61% 39%  44% 56% 0%      Predicted 
     Actual 14% 11% 75%  27% 16% 57%      Actual 
 
Note. LTE = time 1 standard score below the mean of 10. GTE = time 1 standard score above the mean of 10. Time 1 
scores at the mean were divided between the two groups using the procedure described in Chapter 2.  Group n counts 
vary because of deletion of cases based on the case assignment procedures described in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
For all Processing Speed subtests, both the LTE and GTE groups demonstrated 
higher percentages of Actual score progression versus Actual score regression and lower 
percentages of no change than predicted.  For the LTE group, percentages of progression 
and regression for all subtests were higher than predicted.  Actual regression percentages 
for all subtests for the GTE group were lower than predicted.  Progression percentages 
for all subtests in the GTE group were higher than predicted.  Overall, with the exception 
of Cancellation (75% LTE versus 57% GTE), percentages of Actual progression for both  
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groups were roughly equivalent.  Percentages of Actual score regression were higher for 
the GTE group than those for the LTE group for all subtests except Coding (15% versus 
17%). 
  Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine the goodness of fit between 
Actual and Predicted time 2 – time 1 score differences for all subtests and process scores.  
As indicated in Table 13, the chi-square analyses yielded statistically significant results 
beyond the .01 level for all subtests across the LTE and GTE groups. 
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Table 13  
 
Chi-Square Analysis of Actual (Observed) and Predicted (Expected) T2 – T1 Differences 
for Each WISC-IV Subtest Grouped by Time 1 Standard Score Ranges and Time 2 
Regression Categories 
 
 
 
T1 Scaled Scores 
LTE 10 
 T1 Scaled Scores 
GTE 10 
 
Subtest (n) 
 
     
χ2
  
 
Df 
 
 p 
  
 
χ2
 
 
Df 
 
    p  
Vocabulary 
 (n = 102)   
 
448.14 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Vocabulary  
 (n = 125) 
 
701.30 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Information  
(n = 105) 
 
456.20 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Information 
 (n = 119) 
 
495.48 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Similarities 
(n = 95) 
 
109.27 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Similarities 
 (n = 131) 
 
722.3 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Comprehension 
(n = 101) 
 
110.98 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Comprehension 
 (n = 121) 
 
464.77 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Word Reasoning 
(n = 103) 
 
79.67 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Word Reasoning 
 (n = 132) 
 
921.52 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Block Design 
(n = 100) 
 
74.93 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Block Design 
 (n = 131) 
 
962.12 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Matrix Reasoning 
(n = 107) 
 
176.25 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Matrix Reasoning 
 (n = 118) 
 
645.62 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Picture Concepts 
(n = 91) 
 
84.70 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Picture Concepts 
 (n = 135) 
 
1034.12 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Picture Completion 
(n = 95) 
 
132.95 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Picture Completion 
 (n = 142) 
 
2033.92 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Digit Span 
(n = 115) 
 
98.02 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Digit Span 
 (n = 117) 
 
505.57 
 
2 
 
<.01 
DS Forward 
(n = 102) 
 
16.37 
 
2 
 
 <.01 
 DS Forward 
 (n = 136) 
 
455.82 
 
2 
 
<.01 
DS Backward 
(n = 104) 
 
56.66 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 DS Backward 
 (n = 121) 
 
301.25 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Letter Number 
(n = 89) 
 
86.5 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Letter Number 
 (n = 136) 
 
497.20 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Arithmetic 
(n = 51) 
 
8.68 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Arithmetic 
 (n = 65) 
 
82.77 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Coding 
(n = 94) 
 
187.51 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Coding 
 (n = 131) 
 
 1577.19 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Symbol Search 
(n = 80) 
 
54.92 
 
2 
 
<.01 
 Symbol Search 
 (n = 147) 
 
1537.11 
 
2 
 
<.01 
Cancellation 
(n = 103) 
 
96.07 
 
2 
 
<01 
 Cancellation 
 (n = 128) 
 
967.77 
 
2 
 
<.01 
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 The present study was designed with two goals in mind.  The first was to 
determine if a neuropsychologically based performance model better fit WISC-IV subtest 
test-retest data than does a traditional psychometric model.  The second goal was to 
examine the utility of this model compared to traditional psychometric procedures in 
terms of the type of information it provides test consumers about WISC-IV subtest 
performance patterns. 
 Results related to the first goal indicated that, regardless of how the data were 
grouped (total sample versus time 1 standard score and time 2 regression categories of 
LTE and GTE), the performance consistency model (McCloskey, 1990) better 
represented the actual pattern of WISC-IV subtest test-retest differences than did the 
psychometric model (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  Cross-tabulation analyses for the total 
combined sample revealed significant differences between the obtained and predicted 
score-difference frequencies for most performance levels across all subtests.   
 As expected, the range of predicted score-difference frequencies for all subtests 
did not extend beyond the -2 to 2 score band.  For most subtests, there was a greater 
frequency of positive versus negative changes above the -2 to 2 score-difference band, 
regardless of whether the initial scores were above or below the mean.  Likewise, greater 
numbers of extreme test-retest score differences (beyond 4 points) were observed for 
positive versus negative scaled-score differences.  These findings indicate that, as  
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predicted with a neuropsychologically based performance model, examinees were more 
likely to show test-retest score increases than decreases, and, in some cases, the 
frequency and number of performance improvements were exceptionally large. 
 Similar trends in the data were observed when the sample was grouped by time 1 
standard score categories of LTE and GTE.  As a neuropsychological model would 
predict (McCloskey, 2009), chi-square analyses indicated a poor fit between actual and 
predicted score differences for all subtests for both groups.  These findings have two 
implications:  (1) that there is no difference in the predictive power of the psychometric 
model for time 1 scores that are above or below the mean and (2) that WISC-IV subtest 
scores do not show the patterns of regression to the mean predicted by the psychometric 
model. 
 Except in cases where the prediction was no score change from time 1 to time 2, 
the psychometric model predicted score decreases (regression downward toward the 
mean) at time 2 when time 1 scores were above the mean and score increases 
(progression in the form of regression upward toward the mean) at time 2 when time 1 
scores were below the mean.  For the LTE group, this assumption generally held true.  A 
higher percentage of Actual score increases versus Actual score decreases was 
demonstrated for all subtests and process scores.  However, for all subtests, with the 
exception of Matrix Reasoning, the percentage of Actual score increases was greater than 
the percentage of Predicted score increases, suggesting a progression effect beyond what 
was expected based on regression toward the mean.  Likewise, in all cases, there was a  
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higher percentage of Actual score progression than no change even when no change was 
predicted. 
 For the GTE group, the regression model predicted that most examinees would 
demonstrate no test-retest score change or negative change. The GTE group did 
demonstrate some score regression to the mean.  However, for all subtests with the 
exception of Digit Span Backward (40% regression toward the mean versus 35% 
progression away from the mean), the percentage of actual score progression away from 
the mean was higher than the percentage of actual score regression toward the mean.  
Likewise, for all subtests, there was a higher percentage of actual score progression 
versus actual no change and a much higher percentage of actual versus predicted 
progression away from the mean. 
 Additional evidence for the proposition that the movement of scores toward the 
mean in the LTE group was due more to a true progression effect based on brain-state 
changes that enabled more efficient performance than to a regression to the mean effect 
based on a higher probability of a reduced effect of measurement error is the fact that the 
score increases of the LTE group were even greater. 
 A secondary goal of this study was to examine the effectiveness of the 
performance consistency model in conveying information about WISC-IV subtest 
reliability beyond that which is provided by traditional psychometric procedures.  
Traditional methods for estimating test reliability are based on the assumption that 
intelligence is a static trait of which individuals possess a “true” or actual amount (Hale 
& Fiorello, 2004).  Subtests assessing intellectual functioning, if perfectly reliable in  
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measuring one or more facets of this static trait, will show no variability during test-retest 
performance.  Also, in cases where test-retest score variation does occur, these 
fluctuations in performance are attributed to the effects of randomly distributed 
measurement error.  
 Applying this methodology to the present study, we should have found essentially 
no differences between time 1 and time 2 scores, or only minor fluctuations based on the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficients derived from the data.  Also, if measurement 
error contributed to score variation, and it was the only contributor, it should have been 
randomly distributed, leading to equal instances of score regression and progression.  
However, results of the present study indicated overwhelmingly a pattern of retest score 
progression for all of the WISC-IV subtests and process scores. This finding suggests that 
conceptions of reliability based on traditional psychometric theory (Anastasi & Urbina, 
2007) are not a good fit with the manner in which individuals actually perform on re-
administrations of the same tasks.   
 The alternative presented here is a neuropsychologically based performance 
model that better captures the dynamic nature of brain-behavior relationships and the 
manner in which individuals use their brains when they engage tasks (Goldberg, 2001).  
Within this model, increases in retest performance are conceptualized as resulting from 
changes in neural activity that promotes the learning of novel tasks and the more efficient 
execution of previously learned skills (Goldberg & Costa, 1981; Raichle et al., 1994).  
Error is conceptualized as lack of consistency in the use of brain functions, which results 
in lower performance than expected.  In contrast to the traditional psychometric model,  
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increases in retest performance are expected to be more prominent than decreases, with 
the degree of improvement varying based on the psychological demands of the subtest. 
The neuropsychological and educational literature bases have identified several 
potential mediators of retest improvement related to the psychological demands of the 
tasks, including task novelty and motor-speed requirements (Kaufman, 2003; Lezak et 
al., 2004).  Table 14 presents the percentages of the total sample that showed positive, 
negative, and no test-retest scaled-score changes for all subtests along with the test-retest 
reliability coefficients derived from analysis of the data. 
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Table 14 
 
Summary of Percentage of Cases within Score-Change Categories and Reliability 
Coefficients for Each WISC-IV Subtest and Selected Process Scores 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Subtest  Negative Change No Change Positive Change rx1x2  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Vocabulary 27.2 33.5 39.3 .92 
Information 20.1 35.4 44.4 .89 
Similarities 21.4  28.0 50.6 .86 
Comprehension 29.6 26.1 44.5 .82 
Word Reasoning 23.1 20.2 56.7 .82 
Block Design 14.2 26.3 59.5 .82 
Matrix Reasoning 21.3 30.1 48.5 .85 
Picture Concepts 26.9 16.7 56.5 .76 
Picture Completion 6.9 18.9 74.2 .84 
Digit Span 24.8 28.2 46.8 .83 
Digit Span Forward 25.4 30.0 44.5 .76 
Digit Span Backward 29.1 31.2 39.6 .74 
Letter Number 30.2 27.7 42.2 .83 
Arithmetic 25.8    26.7  47.4 .79 
Coding 15.6 16.9 67.6 .84 
Symbol Search 19.7 18.5 61.7 .80 
Cancellation 21.4 14.5  64.1 .79 
______________________________________________________________________  
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For all subtests, the largest percentage of examinees demonstrated scaled-score 
increases of 1 or more points.  Consistent with the literature base, subtests in the PRI and 
PSI indexes showed the greatest percentages of positive change. In general, the PRI and 
PSI subtests are novel and likely to elicit the development of new problem-solving 
strategies.  It may be the use of these problem-solving strategies along with increases in 
motor and cognitive processing speed that account for the greater rates of retest 
improvement demonstrated for these subtests.   
Of course, as previously indicated, not all subtests within a domain measure the 
same cognitive capacity.  The Picture Completion Subtest, within the Perceptual 
Reasoning domain, demonstrated the highest rate of retest improvement among all 
subtests.  Picture Completion requires the examinee to scan pictures and identify the 
missing essential component, but examinees are allowed only 20 seconds to scan each 
item.  For this task, it is likely that robust retest gains are the result of the doubling of 
time of exposure to the pictures, which allows for more efficient scanning on the second 
administration and greater likelihood of identification of missing elements undetected 
during the first administration.  
To understand the retest score patterns for subtests in the Verbal and Working 
Memory domains, it is necessary to examine the primary and secondary cognitive 
capacities measured by these subtests.  As indicated in Table 5 the Verbal subtests, 
specifically Information and Vocabulary, yielded the highest percentages of no test-retest 
score change.  These results are likely related to the memory demands of these tasks.  
Required for successful performance on both subtests is the ability to retrieve information  
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from long-term storage.  Long-term retrieval of verbal information is not a cognitive 
capacity likely to show extreme variation within a short period of time, such as a 2-4 
week retest interval, because these subtests rely on accessing crystallized knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge acquired via formal and informal learning experiences).  We would not expect 
such funds of stored information to be dramatically altered during the test-retest period.  
Minor variations in cognitive efficiency of retrieval, however, are much more common.  
As a result, scores on a second testing are more likely to show a larger number of minor 
fluctuations from the performance demonstrated at first testing.   
As indicated in Table 10, the percentages of score regression and no change were 
particularly high for the Working Memory subtests.  One possible explanation, at least 
for the Digit Span and Letter-Number Sequencing subtests, is that the stimuli to be 
recalled are decontextualized information units presented in random sequences that are 
not as easily handled during initial registration or as easily manipulated in working 
memory as information that is contextual and presented in a coherent, highly meaningful 
sequence, such as an arithmetic word problem or clues to the meaning of a word.  The 
emphasis on random presentation of decontextualized information increases the potential 
for fluctuations in cognitive efficiency as well as the influence of random-error factors.  
Under these more random conditions of presentation and processing, score differences 
would be expected to be much more randomly distributed around the score earned during 
first testing.  
As discussed in the review of the literature, minor variations in retest performance 
are expected for all subtests on the basis of variation in the use of executive function  
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capacities (McCloskey, Perkins, & VanDivner, 2009; McCloskey, 2009a; McCloskey, 
2009b; Denkla, 2007).  For all subtests, efficient engagement of executive functions is 
necessary for consistent performance or improvements in performance across multiple 
administrations of a task. Conversely, variations in the use of executive function 
capacities that direct sustained attention, focused effort, and/or motivation can result in 
small or large variations in performance across multiple administrations of the same task.   
Examination of the change category percentages along with the correlation 
coefficients provided in Table 14 highlights the differences between the clinical utility of 
the neuropsychologically based model and the traditional psychometric model.  Providing 
an average of variability of scores from time 1 to time 2 in the form of a single reliability 
coefficient obscures the score variation patterns that are present in the data, thereby 
reducing clinical utility.  The lack of a meaningful relationship between the score-change 
patterns of each subtest and the reliability coefficient value is very disconcerting as well.  
As a case in point, consider the fact that Vocabulary, a subtest considered to be one of the 
most reliable based on an obtained test-retest coefficient of .92, demonstrates a much 
more diffuse pattern of score changes (27.2% negative change, 33.5% no change, 39.3% 
positive change) than that of Cancellation, a subtest considered to be one of the least 
reliable based on an actual stability coefficient of .79.  However, for Cancellation, there is 
a much less diffuse pattern of score changes (14.5% negative change, 21.4% no change, 
64.1 percent positive change).  Although the mathematical accuracy of the traditional 
psychometric method cannot be denied, the utility of the information conveyed by the 
reliability coefficients for these two subtests is difficult to comprehend, even for test  
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users who have a good grasp of mathematics and test theory.  Suggesting that the 
Vocabulary subtest is more reliable because a higher percentage of cases (33.5%) showed 
no change from time 1 to time 2 than is the case for Cancellation (14.5%) seems to miss 
the very important fact that the outcome of testing at time 2 is much more predictable for 
Cancellation than for Vocabulary in that a majority of cases (64.1%) performed better on 
the second testing and only a small minority (14.5%) performed less effectively.  In the 
case of the Vocabulary subtest, the chances of increasing, decreasing, or staying the same 
on the second testing are nearly identical, making predictions much less accurate than in 
the case of the Cancellation subtest. 
Showing the results of test-retest studies in the change category format used in 
Table 14 along with the reliability coefficients would be one way of increasing the 
clinical utility of the information offered about test-retest studies as discussed in the 
previous example.  Other formats that reflect the range of the variability of the score 
changes, however, might be even more effective.  In the case example just mentioned, 
knowing that the large majority of the variability of change for the Vocabulary subtest is 
contained within the range of -1 to +1 scaled-score points enables the clinician to 
appreciate the relatively stable nature of the Vocabulary subtest.  It would also allow 
clinicians to understand that while Vocabulary scores may fluctuate somewhat 
unpredictably, the degree of fluctuation is negligible in terms of statistical or clinical 
significance.  Knowing that the range of positive gains for the Cancellation subtest can 
vary greatly is equally important, but such knowledge should not diminish a test user’s 
confidence in the Cancellation subtest as a reliable measure of processing speed.  Rather,  
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the data on range of score changes enable the clinician to anticipate the likely changes in 
a score profile if the test were re-administered within 2-4 weeks. The degree of 
consistency of the observed patterns of changes with the neuropsychologically based 
model predictions of variability of performance demonstrates the enhanced utility of such 
a model over the traditional psychometric model.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The present study represents an initial attempt at reconceptualizing the concept of 
reliability and the manner in which intelligence-test subtest reliability is presented.  As 
such, future research is needed to refine this study’s methodology and to extend its 
results.  
 A major limitation that may affect the generalizability of the findings was the test-
retest interval, which averaged 32 days.  With this short interval, it is difficult to establish 
the levels of retest performance increases that might be expected in actual clinical 
situations, where the test-retest interval is likely to be longer.  Future research could 
address this limitation by evaluating changes in subtest performance at various time 
intervals.  Of course, doing so will require consideration of other factors that may account 
for performance changes, such as maturation and other historical events. 
 Another limitation of this study was its failure to include larger samples of special 
populations who may demonstrate patterns of test-retest score changes different from 
those demonstrated by the standardization sample.  The WISC-IV standardization sample 
excluded several subgroups, including those with limited English proficiency and those 
with a history of physical impairment that might depress performance, such as stroke,  
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epilepsy, brain tumor, traumatic brain injury, history of brain surgery, encephalitis, and 
meningitis.  Future research using the performance consistency model with these 
populations has the potential to further our understanding of the effects of different types 
of brain injuries and impairments on retest performance.  Also, in cases where 
intelligence-test subtests are used as baseline measures and/or to measure progress or 
deterioration, the model presented here may provide a method for predicting rate of 
recovery based on subtest improvement. 
Also necessary is additional research applying the performance consistency model 
to samples of learning-disabled (LD) children. Despite recent interest in alternative 
methods for learning-disability identification, such as the Response to Intervention Model 
(Gresham et al., 2005), the use of intellectual assessment instruments remains a common 
practice when evaluating children suspected of having learning disabilities.  Furthermore, 
research by Fiorello et al., (2007) indicates that children with learning disabilities are 
more likely to show variable versus flat subtest profiles.   
These findings suggest that future research is needed to identify the patterns of 
retest performance associated with LD subtypes.  Such research has the potential of 
providing additional support for the idiographic approach to intelligence-test 
interpretation.   It may also provide valuable information for practitioners who include 
cognitive assessment as part of the re-evaluation process or when testing procedures are  
unintentionally duplicated. 
Finally, the present study demonstrated that a neuropsychologically based 
performance model is more effective at representing WISC-IV subtest test-retest  
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reliability than are traditional psychometric procedures.  In doing so, it provided both the 
rationale and the methodology for future studies to evaluate new methods of predicting 
retest performance based on knowledge of the psychological demands of the task.  
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